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Various developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, are highly likely to miss 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNDP 2005a: 9). This does not apply 
only to the first and most prominent target, the halving the incidence of absolute poverty 
(the proportion of people living on less than one dollar a day) by the year 2015. Even 
though more specific MDGs have received less attention in the public debate, the 
prospects for achieving education and health-related targets are still worse (Berg and 
Qureshi 2005: 21). Easterly (2005) lists ‘a litany of failure’ by referring to the report on 
the MDGs presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the UN World 
Summit in September 2005 (UN 2005). 
To turn the tide, recent reports published by the UN Millennium Project, directed by 
Jeffrey Sachs (UNDP 2005a), and the Commission for Africa, set up by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (CFA 2005), have issued urgent calls to increase official development aid 
substantially and, thereby, close the gap between donor rhetoric and reality. 
Accordingly, donors are mainly compared with regard to their ‘generosity’ in granting 
aid. Japan and the United States are widely blamed for falling grossly short of the UN 
target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income to be devoted to aid, whereas the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries exceeded this target in 2004 (OECD 2006).  
In addition to the quantity of aid, qualitative aspects of aid allocation are increasingly 
recognized to be important for effectively meeting recipient needs. Several studies make 
the point that aid effectiveness could be improved if aid were better targeted to poor 
recipient countries with reasonably good local conditions, e.g., in terms of basic 
institutions and economic policies that would allow aid to be absorbed productively 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002).1 
Most studies that compare the allocation of aid across donors conclude that donor 
performance varies widely. According to Dollar and Levin (2006), some donors 
(International Development Association (IDA), Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden) take both the prevalence of poverty and the 
quality of institutions and economic policy into account, whereas France and the United 
States do not.2 For the United States and Japan, geopolitical and commercial interests 
seem to be the most important determinants of aid, respectively (Alesina and Dollar 
2000).3 Berthélemy (2006) finds that ‘all donors are not the same’ with respect to 
various indicators of recipient need as well as donor interest. However, a drawback of 
                                                 
1    However, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) and Hudson and Mosley 
(2001) test the robustness of the interaction term between the Burnside-Dollar policy index and aid, 
reporting the interaction to be statistically insignificant in many cases. 
2   Amprou et al. (2005) show that the pattern of donor selectivity changes considerably once the 
vulnerability of recipient countries to exogenous shocks and their level of human capital are 
considered as additional selectivity criteria. 
3   Multilateral institutions seem generally to pay greater attention to recipient needs than bilateral donors 
do (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Dollar 2000). Canavire et al. (2006) find no indication that 
donor countries were able to push through their individual trade and political interests at the 
multilateral level. However, various other studies suggest that multilateral institutions are not 
invulnerable to donor pressure (Weck-Hannemann and Schneider 1981; Frey and Schneider 1986; 
Dreher 2004; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Kilby 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2006; Dreher and 
Jensen 2007). 2 
all these studies is that they are based on aggregate aid figures. None goes beyond 
excluding emergency support from ‘regular’ aid, even though Harms and Lutz (2005: 
35) conclude from a survey on the economic growth effects of aid that ‘it is not 
surprising that a variable as aggregate as official development assistance does not have 
a robust effect on growth’.  
Only few of the studies addressing the actual behaviour of donors take up the issue of 
aid heterogeneity. A notable example is Roodman (2004), who provides a detailed 
account of donor performance by combining quantitative and qualitative measures of 
aid, including ‘penalties’ for tying aid and so-called project proliferation as well as a 
discounting system favouring aid to poorer and better-governed countries. Yet, his 
ranking of donors is dominated by differences in the overall quantity of aid. More 
specifically, Neumayer (2005) assesses the allocation of food aid. His findings 
underscore the need for a disaggregated analysis of aid. The allocation of food aid 
differs strikingly from previous results on the allocation of overall aid; food aid appears 
to be better targeted at countries in need than other forms of aid. However, food aid 
accounted for just about 3 per cent of total aid in the late 1990s. 
The sectoral composition of aid, on which we focus in this paper, has barely received 
attention in previous efforts to account for aid heterogeneity. This is surprising once it is 
taken into consideration that the sectoral composition of aid should have an important 
say on whether or not donors help achieving MDGs other than the general target of 
halving absolute poverty. In this paper, we follow Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 
(2004) in drawing on the sectorally disaggregated data on aid commitments provided by 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Creditor Reporting System. In 
contrast to the analysis of growth effects by Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004), 
however, we take a broader view and differentiate aid by the various specific purposes it 
is meant to serve according to announcements made by donors. Donors stress the multi-
dimensional objective function underlying their aid allocation (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 
2003).4 In a similar vein, McGillivray (2003) as well as Amprou, Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney (2005) call for a broader concept of aid selectivity and make a 
case for extending the selectivity model based on the income and policy situation of 
recipient countries proposed by Collier and Dollar (2002). While it is widely 
acknowledged that aid may reduce poverty through its impact on economic growth, ‘it 
must also be recognized that aid can reduce poverty through other channels’ 
(McGillivray 2003: 29). Pro-poor public expenditures, e.g., in the fields of basic 
education and basic health, are often noted in this context.5 The MDGs provide the 
obvious point of departure for taking account of a broader range of poverty-relevant 
objectives of aid.6 
                                                 
4   For instance, Svensson (2005) notes that the Swedish aid agency SIDA lists five objectives in addition 
to promoting economic growth in the recipient country: economic and social equality; economic and 
political independence; democratic development; environmental care; and gender equality. 
5   As another example, Abu-Ghadia and Klasen (2004) calculate substantial costs in terms of mortality 
and prevalence of underweight children under five for 45 countries likely to miss the target on gender 
equality. 
6   In the words of Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003: 10), the MDGs ‘identify multidimensional poverty 
reduction as the ultimate objective of development efforts’. 3 
Specifically, we compare the aid portfolio of various bilateral and multilateral donors 
and investigate whether they have prioritized aid in line with the MDGs. For example, 
the MDGs suggest that aid should be targeted at improving basic education and health 
conditions in recipient countries. In section 2, we examine to what extent donors have 
channelled aid to priority sectors. Section 3 evaluates whether donors have allocated 
sector-specific aid according to specific needs of recipient countries. In a Tobit 
regression analysis, we combine disaggregated aid data with indicators reflecting the 
situation of recipient countries with regard to the MDGs. Section 4 summarizes the 
main conclusions of the paper. 
2  The sectoral allocation of aid: some stylized facts 
In examining the sectoral composition of aid, we first consider all donors taken together 
and then look at selected donors individually. These include the two main multilateral 
donors (EU and IDA), the five biggest bilateral donors (France, Germany, Japan, United 
States, and United Kingdom), and a group of countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, 
and Sweden), which not only are generous donors but are also supposed to target aid 
carefully according to recipient needs.7 For all aid categories we apply the grant 
equivalent, i.e., the product of the nominal amount of aid and the grant element; this 
variable best reflects the effective financial support of donors.8 In addition, we employ 
commitments which in the study of aid allocation are superior to disbursements because 
they constitute the decision variable over which donors exert full control (Neumayer 
2003).  
As shown in Table 1, the sectoral composition of aid for all donors taken together has 
changed quite dramatically since the early 1990s. With regard to the MDGs, the most 
notable result is that the share of aid devoted to the social sector rose from about 20 per 
cent in the period 1990-92 to about 35 per cent in the period 2002-04, with higher 
spending on education, health and population programmes, though not on water and 
sanitation. The expansion of social sector aid has come at the expense of aid towards 
more traditional targets such as infrastructure, but it also reflects a move from 
programme assistance to project financing. The latter is somewhat at odds with donors’ 
claims to promote ownership of development strategies on the part of recipients, which 
would require general budget support rather than a proliferation of projects. Emergency 
relief and reconstruction is an aid category that has recently gained importance.9  
The overall pattern of aid masks substantial variations across donors (Table 2). The 
share of aid going to the social sector ranges from 23 per cent in Japan to 50 per cent in 
Norway. Within this aid category, it is striking that France and Germany put a strong 
focus on education but spend very little on primary education, even though the MDGs 
                                                 
7   Neumayer (2003) calls these countries like-minded donors; Kilby (2006) employs these countries’ aid 
allocation as a humanitarian benchmark. 
8   We also considered nominal aid. The results for nominal aid hardly differed from those for grant 
equivalents, which is not surprising given the extremely high grant element of aid (Nunnenkamp, 
Thiele and Wilfer 2005). Consequently, we do not report the results for nominal aid below. 
9   The empirical finding that aid can be highly effective in post-conflict situations (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004) lends support to this new priority of donors. 4 
require donors to concentrate on basic education. Likewise, the composition of 
educational aid by Denmark, Japan and the EC does not suggest a strong orientation 
towards the respective MDG. Only in the Netherlands, Norway, and particularly in the 
United Kingdom, primary education carries markedly higher weight. The leading position 
of the UK carries over to the concentration of aid on basic health services and population 
programmes (mainly spending on HIV/AIDS), where it is followed by the United States, 
Denmark and Norway. As in education, the health-related aid committed by France and 
Japan does not appear to finance basic services from which poor population segments 
might benefit most. Denmark and Germany are the only donors that provide a non-
negligible share of total aid for basic water and sanitation.  
Among the other aid categories mainly related to social rather than economic objectives, 
environmental protection and the promotion of gender equality—which both explicitly 
correspond to MDGs (see Annex)—have received little attention from most donors. The 
smaller donors, with the exception of Norway, channel a considerable part of their aid 
budget through NGOs. Similar to social sector aid, these funds are unlikely to spur 
economic growth in the short to medium term, as various NGOs focus on providing social 
services rather than financing projects in economic infrastructure or production sectors. 
In summary, most donors’ sectoral aid composition appears to be in line with a multi-
dimensional objective function rather than one that narrowly focuses on economic 
growth. At the same time, the focus of aid differs considerably across donors as well as 
across MDG-related targets. In the subsequent section, we examine in more detail 
whether donors have succeeded in reaching their multiple objectives by carefully 
targeting aid to those recipients most in need.  
Table 1 
Distribution of aid (grant equivalent) by all donors across sectors,  
1990-92 and 2002-04 (per cent of total aid) (a 
Sector 1990-92  2002-04 
    
Social infrastructure and services  20.7  34.5 
 Education,  total  5.9  8.2 
  – Basic education  0.8  2.8 
 Health,  total  3.1  4.8 
  – Basic health  1.3  3.0 
  Population programmes and reproductive health  1.7  3.8 
  Water supply and sanitation  4.9  3.9 
  – Basic water and sanitation  1.1  0.8 
Economic infrastructure  21.0  13.4 
Production sectors  17.7  7.3 
Multisector/cross-cutting 10.1  8.5 
 General  environmental protection  1.6  1.9 
  Women in development  0.1  0.1 
Commodity aid/general programme assistance  20.0  9.6 
  General budget support  12.5  7.0 
Action relating to debt  6.8  10.2 
Emergency assistance and reconstruction 2.7  10.4 
Support to NGOs  0.1  1.9 
Other 0.9  4.2 
Note:  (a  Period average of aid commitments. 
Source:     OECD (2006). 5 
Table 2 
Distribution of aid (grant equivalent) across sectors for major donors, 2002-04 







































































                       
Social infrastructure & services 38.5  32.3  38.2  22.5  26.8  50.0  33.2  45.3  33.3  34.7  30.9 
 Education,  total  6.8  19.2  15.7  8.6  6.6  13.6  5.8  10.0  1.7  5.2  7.3 
  – Basic education  2.8  1.2  1.8  1.5  4.0  7.1  2.6  8.2  1.4  1.6  3.6 
 Health,  total  8.1  3.7  3.0  3.9  3.2  7.0  3.9  9.1  4.2  3.3  5.2 
  – Basic health  6.3  0.5  1.7  1.2  1.6  3.5  1.8  5.5  4.1  2.6  2.3 
 Population  programmes  1.1  0.3  1.9  0.1  2.1  3.0  3.3  7.6  8.5  1.5  3.6 
  Water supply & sanitation  10.5  2.6  7.0  7.9  3.5  1.7  2.4  1.5  0.6  3.5  5.6 
  – Basic water & sanitation  4.6  0.4  3.3  0.9  1.4  0.6  0.6  0.2  0.0  0.6  0.0 
Economic infrastructure  16.9  3.7  12.4  39.0  5.9  8.3  6.4  9.5  3.3  13.3  23.8 
Production sectors  10.0  4.0  4.5  8.6  4.8  6.3  3.5  5.2  6.4  8.7  8.9 
Multisector  7.2  6.3  11.3  3.9  6.1  9.2  11.9  5.3  12.8  9.5  3.7 
 General  environment 
protection 
5.0  2.7  2.4  2.8  2.9  2.5  2.5  1.1  1.5  1.7  1.0 
  Women in development  0.8  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.4  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Commodity aid/general 
programme assistance 
5.0  4.4  1.3  4.0  4.2  3.3  4.4  16.1  13.7  14.5  23.3 
  General budget support  5.0  3.3  0.5  3.3  4.1  3.2  4.4  14.7  7.2  9.9  22.8 
Action relating to debt  2.2  39.7  22.3  15.6  5.8  1.4  3.8  6.2  8.7  0.7  2.6 
Emergency assistance & 
reconstruction 
4.8  8.6  3.8  3.4  9.1  20.3  19.2  11.7  17.1  14.3  7.1 
Support to NGOs  6.1  0.4  0.3  1.4  27.1  0.0  9.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Source: OECD  (2006). 
3  Relating aid allocation to aid objectives  
3.1  Approach and data 
In order to assess whether aid committed in 2002-04 was conducive to achieving the 
MDGs, we proceed as follows. First, we select various indicators reflecting the situation 
of recipient countries in the year 2000 (or the closest year if no data are available for 
2000) with regard to the MDGs (‘indicators of need’).10 The choice of indicators is very 
much in line with the list of indicators suggested by the World Bank to evaluate 
progress made towards the MDGs.11 We do not consider more traditional aid targets 
such as the development of infrastructure facilities and agricultural development, even 
though aid in infrastructure and production sectors such as agriculture continued to be 
                                                 
10  For the complete list of indicators, definitions and data sources, see the Annex. 
11    See, for example, www.ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId=LNA 
V01HOME1; or www.siteresources. worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Resources/Document/DC 2003-
0003-Add.1all.pdf. 6 
important for some donors (see Table 2). Recent research has indicated that aid granted 
for improved infrastructure, notably with regard to transportation systems and energy 
supply, as well as for overcoming agricultural supply bottlenecks may help alleviate 
poverty and, thus, contribute to achieving the MDGs (Agence Française de 
Développement et al. 2005). However, in this paper we focus on aid items and 
indicators of need that are directly related to the MDGs. 
Second, we select various aid categories from the sectorally disaggregated DAC 
database on aid commitments (DAC’s Creditor Reporting System, CRS) that are 
supposed to be most relevant for aid to be effective in contributing to the MDGs. The 
selection of aid categories ranges from very specific categories such as basic drinking 
water supply and basic sanitation (so-called 5-digit CRS purpose codes) to more broadly 
defined categories such as education and health (so-called DAC sector codes). In 
addition, we consider aid commitments in all sectors combined to assess whether the 
pursuit of specific targets was strong enough to show up in overall aid allocations. The 
matching of aid targets, indicators of need and aid categories is specified in the Annex. 
We employ Tobit models to assess whether donors allocated total as well as sector-
specific aid in accordance to indicators of need for an overall sample of 140 recipient 
countries.12 The Tobit approach is chosen because it takes the truncation of the aid 
variable into account.13 This is of particular relevance for smaller donors such as 
Norway and Denmark, which tend to concentrate their aid on a few recipients. With 
many ‘zero’ observations, OLS estimates are biased as they do not capture the non-
linearity in the estimated relationship.  
Apart from the MDG-related indicators of need, we include per capita income and 
governance as explanatory variables. The per capita income of recipient countries can 
be interpreted as an encompassing indicator of need and has repeatedly been shown to 
shape donors’ aggregate aid allocations (Berthélemy 2006; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 
2006; Dollar and Levin 2006; Neumayer 2003). Per capita income may also have an 
impact on the allocation of sector-specific aid. On the one hand, some specific 
indicators of need, though far from all, are highly correlated with per capita income.14 
Hence, the impact of specific indicators of need may be taken up by per capita income. 
On the other hand, donors may refer to rather broad measures of need even when 
deciding on the allocation of sector-specific aid.15 
As concerns governance, some recent studies suggest that recipient countries receive 
less aid than indicators of need would suggest because they are badly governed 
                                                 
12    As detailed when presenting the results, the number of observations is sometimes considerably 
smaller due to missing data for specific indicators of need. 
13    Heckman’s sample selection model and a two-step probit estimation have been suggested as 
alternative approaches to deal with the truncated nature of aid variables (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). 
For an explanation why the Tobit approach may be considered the preferred option, see Canavire et al. 
(2006). 
14 Pairwise correlations with per capita income exceed 0.6 for several indicators of need (e.g., average 
years of schooling, births attended by skilled health staff, access to sanitation). By contrast, 
correlations with per capita income are below 0.1 for some indicators, most surprisingly perhaps for 
the prevalence of HIV. 
15 See also the discussion of fungibility below. 7 
(Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006). One option to control for 
governance would be to use the World Bank’s country policy and institutional 
assessment (CPIA). We decided against this option, as publicly available information on 
the CPIA is still rudimentary and its use would reduce the number of observations 
considerably. Instead, we employ ‘voice and accountability’, an institutional index 
provided by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) that refers to the extent to which a 
country’s citizens can participate in selecting their governments as well as to freedom of 
expression, association and the media. As such, the index serves as a proxy for the 
development of democratic institutions. Democracy is often mentioned by donors as an 
important precondition for aid to be effective, and there is at least some evidence (e.g., 
Gates and Hoeffler 2004) that donors have acted accordingly by giving more aid to 
democratic governments. We also considered the level of corruption, another element of 
governance typically emphasized in donor statements, but this variable turned out to be 
insignificant in all but a few cases, supporting what Alesina and Weder (2002) find for 
an earlier period. Results for corruption therefore are not reported below. 
We deliberately do not control for variables that reflect donors’ self-interest in the 
allocation of aid. This is not to ignore that donors do pursue their own economic and 
political interests when deciding on aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy and 
Tichit 2004; Canavire et al. 2006; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006). The self-
interest of donors may well have the effect that many of the coefficients reported below 
remain insignificant. But this would not invalidate the conclusion to be drawn from 
insignificant coefficients, namely that donors contributed less for achieving the MDGs 
than public statements suggest. 
Yet, our approach has some limitations. Arguably, the indicators of need may be 
endogenous to the allocation of aid. For example, the correlation between the primary 
school enrolment ratio in recipient countries and aid for basic education may understate 
the extent to which donors took low enrolment ratios into account when deciding on the 
allocation of educational aid as educational aid may help raise primary enrolment. 
However, reverse causation of this sort should not pose a major problem for our 
analysis because of the considerable time lags involved. As shown by Clemens, Radelet 
and Bhavnani (2004), less than half of total aid can reasonably be expected to have 
short-term effects on the economic performance of recipient countries. Furthermore, at 
least some of the indicators used here are clearly exogenous.16 For other indicators, the 
risk of reverse causation is minimized by using data for 2000, whereas aid data refer to 
2002-04. 
Furthermore, even if the allocation of sector-specific aid was in line with the MDGs, 
this would not necessarily imply higher foreign plus local resources devoted to specific 
targets. The fungibility of aid may undermine donor attempts to direct more funds to 
specific targets. However, aid for, say, basic education or rural infrastructure is unlikely 
to be fully fungible (Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu 1998).17 This is particularly true in 
countries heavily dependent on aid, where the large contribution of aid to public budgets 
                                                 
16   For example, ‘malaria ecology’ represents an ecologically based indicator that is predictive of the 
extent of malaria transmission and combines information on temperature, mosquito abundance and 
mosquito vector type. 
17 In an evaluation of a rural road rehabilitation project in Vietnam, van de Walle and Mu (2007) show 
that, on balance, more roads were built in project areas, indicating less than full fungibility.  8 
limits the discretion of local governments to shift resources. The observation that donors 
devoted an increasing share of aid to specific purposes such as basic education and basic 
health (see Table 2) indeed suggests that they expected fungibility to be limited. 
Otherwise, the fine-tuning of aid according to specific purposes would not make sense. 
In any case, donors are hardly to blame if the correlation with indicators of need turns 
out to be weaker for total (foreign and local) financing than for aid financing alone. This 
leaves the question of whether the allocation of sector-specific aid is driven by need in a 
broader sense rather than specific sector-related indicators of need. As noted before, the 
inclusion of per capita income in the regressions for sector-specific aid may help answer 
this question. The coefficient of per capita income (the encompassing indicator of need) 
should then be negative, whereas the coefficient of the specific indicator of need should 
be insignificant. 
In running the regressions, we distinguish an unweighted and a population-weighted 
version of the Tobit model. The unweighted model follows the bulk of the aid allocation 
literature in that each recipient country, independent of its size, is treated as an 
observation with an equal weight attached to it. The rationale behind this specification is 
that donors tend to decide on aid portfolios at the country level. Aid quotas for 
individual countries have been shown to be fairly stable in the short run, even if 
countries become less needy or they experience changes in institutional quality 
(Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006). Moreover, attaching more weight to more populated 
recipient countries is difficult to reconcile with the frequently observed small-country 
bias, according to which per capita aid tends to be higher for smaller recipient countries. 
However, the traditional approach of assessing the allocation of aid may be 
inappropriate when it comes to analysing whether the allocation of aid is in line with the 
MDGs.18 Arguably, giving equal weight to all recipient countries is in contrast to the 
MDGs, which refer to percentages of the global population. This is why we weight the 
explanatory variables by the respective country’s population in a modified Tobit model 
so that the unit of observation is no longer the country but rather the individual. Results 
for the weighted model are likely to be driven largely by China and India, which 
together account for 47 per cent of the population of all sample countries. In order to 
assess the sensitivity of results, we re-estimate the weighted model without these two 
hugely populated countries. As is shown below, our results strongly depend on the 
choice between these models.  
3.2  Results for aid by all donors  
We first investigate whether all donors taken together considered MDG-related 
indicators of need in the allocation of aid. Specifically, we evaluate (i) whether 
indicators of need affected specific aid categories such as basic health and basic 
education; (ii) whether or not the relationship persists on the next level of aid 
aggregation such as health and education; and (iii) whether the indicator was considered 
important enough by donors to have shaped the allocation of total aid. We estimate all 
three versions of the Tobit model, always controlling for GDP per capita as well as 
‘voice and accountability’.  
                                                 
18 We owe this important point to an anonymous referee. 9 
In the unweighted Tobit model, both GDP per capita and ‘voice and accountability’ turn 
out to be significant with the expected sign in all but the CO2 emissions regression 
when we look at total commitments.19 Donors thus appear to target foreign aid towards 
poorer and more democratic recipients. The general poverty orientation of aid we find is 
very much in accordance with the previous literature (e.g., Dollar and Levin 2006; 
Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006). At the same time, our analysis adds to the hitherto 
limited evidence (in particular, Gates and Hoeffler 2004) that points to donors 
rewarding democratic institutions.  
In a number of cases, GDP per capita and ‘voice and accountability’ remain significant 
at lower levels of disaggregation. For example, the allocation of aid for basic education 
as well as aid for population and reproductive health programmes is shown to be 
targeted to poorer recipients with more democratic institutions. The same applies to 
developmental food aid, a finding that is consistent with a recent study by Neumayer 
(2005) according to which, self-interest of the donors has not played a role in the 
distribution of food aid. 
Turning to our variables of particular interest, aid appears to be only weakly targeted 
according to specific indicators of need (Table 3). Notable exceptions are the fight 
against hunger and HIV/AIDS, and to a lesser extent, the provision of access to 
improved water. But even these indicators do not remain significant at higher levels of 
aid aggregation. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS, for instance, had an impact on the size 
of donor-financed population and reproductive health programmes but not on the 
allocation of aid for the entire health sector or total aid.  
At the level of total aid, two indicators of need—malnutrition of children and the 
number of births attended by skilled health staff—are significant but carry an 
unexpected sign. This is likely to be caused by the correlation of these variables with 
GDP per capita. If we re-run the regressions without GDP per capita, both coefficients 
become insignificant. Furthermore, the results for environmental sustainability (target 9) 
are in conflict with the underlying assumption that donors may have considered the 
listed indicators to reflect the need for environmental aid. If anything, the opposite was 
true. In the case of CO2 emissions, this is because per capita emissions increase in line 
with rising per capita income of recipient countries.20 Whatever the environmental 
concerns donors might have wished to address by granting aid, they were dominated by 
the general poverty orientation of aid when it comes to the correlation between aid and 
CO2 emissions. In the case of nationally protected areas, the positive correlation with 
aid committed to environmental protection suggests that the focus of donors was on 
helping protect existing habitats, rather than financing the creation of new ones where 
nationally protected areas accounted for a small percentage of total land area. 
If we weigh all recipients by the size of their population, results change quite 
dramatically. In contrast to the unweighted model, GDP per capita often remains 
insignificant and ‘voice and accountability’ turns out to be insignificant almost across 
the board. As detailed below, this surprising result is mainly due to the high weights 
 
                                                 
19 Results for the control variables are not reported in the tables; detailed results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
20 The correlation between these two variables is as high as 0.60. 10 
Table 3 
Tobit results for total aid by all donors (unweighted) (a  
Targets/indicators of need (b Aid  categories  (c 
      
Target 2: Hunger  Total aid  Developmental food aid  Emergency food aid 
¯ Undernourishment (99)  0.03  0.01  0.04*** 
¯ Malnutrition of children (83) -0.67*** -0.03*  0.02 
      
Target 3: Primary schooling  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
¯ Net primary enrolment (89) -0.20  0.02  -0.02 
¯ Primary completion rate (98)  0.03  0.02  -0.01 
¯ Average yrs of schooling (71)  0.76  0.27  0.08 
      
Target 4: Gender disparity in 
education 
Total aid  Education  Basic education 
¯ Ratio girls/boys in education (110)  0.14  0.05  -0.01 
¯ Literacy ratio, males/females (89)  -5.87  0.09  -0.14 
      
Target 5: Under-5 mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Under-5 mortality rate (121)  -0.02  -0.01  0.00 
¯ Immunization, measles (121)  0.14  0.02  0.00 
      
Target 6: Maternal mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Maternal mortality ratio (113)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
¯ Births attended (99) 0.42*  0.03  0.01 
      
Target 7: HIV/AIDS  Total aid  Health  Population programmes 
¯ Prevalence of HIV (92) -0.01  -0.01  0.08*** 
      
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Incidence tuberculosis (121)  -0.02  0.00  0.00 
¯ Malaria ecology (111)  0.11  0.02  0.01 
      
Target 9: Environmental 
sustainability 
Total aid  Environmental protection Agricultural land resources
¯ CO2 emissions (120)  -1.77  -0.06*  0.00 
¯ Forest area (117)  0.21  0.01  0.00 
¯ Nationally protected areas (130)  0.10**  0.00  0.00* 
¯ GDP per unit of energy use (79)  -0.09  0.03  0.03 
      
Targets 10/11: Water & 
sanitation/slum dwellers 
Total aid  Water supply & sanitation Basic drinking water 
¯ Access to improved water (113)  -0.03  0.03  -0.00* 
¯ Access to improved sanitation 
(111) 
0.11 0.03*  -0.00 
Notes:
  (a   Based on a Tobit model estimated with per capita income and governance as controls; 
controls and constant term not reported. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, 
respectively; 
  (b   Number of observations in parentheses. For definition and sources, see Annex; 
  (c   Period average of grant equivalent of aid in 2002-04, per capita of the recipient countries' 
population. 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex. 
attached to China and India. On the other hand, the estimates in Table 4 show that 
several additional MDG-related targets in the field of education (primary completion 
rates, average years of schooling21) and health (under-five mortality, maternal 
                                                 
21 It has to be noted that this indicator is clearly inferior to the other two indicators supposed to reflect 
the situation of recipient countries with regard to primary schooling. Target 3 requires donors to focus 
on primary education, while average years of schooling (which we considered in accordance to the 
World Bank suggestions mentioned above) include more advanced levels of education. 11 
mortality, tuberculosis and malaria) affected donor decisions. These targets as well as 
those already found significant in the unweighted regressions are not only linked to 
specific aid categories, but also influenced the allocation of total aid. The weighted 
regressions thus suggest a more widespread targeting of aid according to specific 
indicators of need, even though certain indicators such as net primary school enrolment 
rates, the male-to-female literacy ratio and the rate of immunization against measles 
remain insignificant. 
Replicating the weighted regressions without China and India illustrates that these two 
countries have a decisive influence on the population-weighted Tobit results. For a start, 
the allocation of total aid is now again strongly poverty oriented, with the coefficient of 
GDP per capita being significant at the 5 per cent level or better in all specifications. In 
most instances, donors also appear to have considered GDP per capita as an 
 
Table 4 
Tobit results for total aid by all donors (weighted, including China and India) (a  
Targets/indicators of need (b Aid  categories  (c 
      
Target 2: Hunger  Total aid  Developmental food aid  Emergency food aid 
¯ Undernourishment  0.51***  0.02***  0.03** 
¯ Malnutrition of children  -0.53***  -0.02**  0.02 
      
Target 3: Primary schooling  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
¯ Net primary enrolment  -0.21*  -0.01  -0.01 
¯ Primary completion rate   -0.32***  -0.03***  -0.01** 
¯ Average yrs of schooling  -4.26***  -0.37***  -0.22*** 
      
Target 4: Gender disparity in 
education  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
¯ Ratio girls/boys in education   0.17  0.02   0.01* 
¯ Literacy ratio, males/females    0.50  0.57  0.26 
      
Target 5: Under-5 mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Under-5 mortality rate    0.10***   0.01***  0.00*** 
¯ Immunization, measles   0.15*  0.01  0.00 
      
Target 6: Maternal mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Maternal mortality ratio   0.02***  0.00***  0.00*** 
¯ Births attended   0.25**  0.01  0.00 
      
Target 7: HIV/AIDS  Total aid  Health  Population programmes 
¯ Prevalence of HIV    1.28***   0.07**’  0.12*** 
      
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Incidence tuberculosis    0.03**  0.00***  0.00*** 
¯ Malaria ecology   0.83***  0.05***  0.02*** 
      
Target 9: Environmental 
sustainability  Total aid  Environmental protection Agricultural land resources
¯ CO2 emissions   -1.33  -0.02   -0.02 
¯ Forest area   0.19**  0.00*  0.00 
¯ Nationally protected areas   0.16  0.01***  0.00  
¯ GDP per unit of energy use    0.12  0.01  0.01 
      
Targets 10/11: Water & 
sanitation/slum dwellers  Total aid  Water supply & sanitation  Basic drinking water 
¯ Access to improved water  -0.33***  -0.01  -0.01*** 
¯ Access to improved sanitation   0.36***  0.02***  -0.00 
Notes and source: as given in Table 3 
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encompassing indicator of need when allocating aid to specific sectors. Likewise, once 
India and China are excluded from the sample, ‘voice and accountability’ becomes an 
important determinant of sector-specific aid. At the most disaggregated aid level, we find 
that donors were consistently more generous towards poorer and more democratic 
recipients except in the case of emergency food aid, which is driven by specific need. The 
stronger impact of GDP per capita and ‘voice and accountability’ in this version of the 
Tobit model is mainly due to the exclusion of India, which constitutes an outlier in the 
sense that it received very little aid per capita despite being a relatively poor country with 
democratic institutions. China is richer and more autocratic, but its aid inflows were still 
lower than the prevailing levels of per capita income and governance would predict.  
Table 5 reports the effects of the MDG-related indicators of need on aid allocations. The 
number of significant coefficients is somewhat lower than in the weighted regressions 
that include China and India, especially at higher levels of aid aggregation. The overall 
 
Table 5 
Tobit results for total aid by all donors (weighted, excluding China and India) (a  
Targets/indicators of need (b Aid  categories  (c 
      
Target 2: Hunger  Total aid  Developmental food aid  Emergency food aid 
¯ Undernourishment  0.38***  0.01***  0.03*** 
¯ Malnutrition of children  -0.49***  -0.01  0.02* 
      
Target 3: Primary schooling  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
¯ Net primary enrolment   -0.17  -0.01  -0.01 
¯ Primary completion rate   -0.20***  -0.02**  -0.01 
¯ Average yrs of schooling   -0.68  -0.18  -0.15* 
      
Target 4: Gender disparity in 
education  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
¯ Ratio girls/boys in education   -0.18  -0.01  -0.01 
¯ Literacy ratio, males/females   0.55  0.82  0.40** 
      
Target 5: Under-5 mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Under-5 mortality rate   0.04  0.00**  0.00*** 
¯ Immunization, measles   0.06  0.00  0.00 
      
Target 6: Maternal mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Maternal mortality ratio   0.01**  0.00***  0.00*** 
¯ Births attended   0.24***  0.01  0.00 
      
Target 7: HIV/AIDS  Total aid  Health  Population programmes 
¯ Prevalence of HIV  0.56*  0.04**  0.10*** 
      
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
¯ Incidence tuberculosis   0.00  0.00  0.00* 
¯ Malaria ecology   0.11  0.02  0.01 
      
Target 9: Environmental 
sustainability  Total aid  Environmental protection Agricultural land resources
¯ CO2 emissions   -0.36  0.00  0.00 
¯ Forest area   0.07  0.00  0.00 
¯ Nationally protected areas   0.04  0.01*  0.00 
¯ GDP per unit of energy use   0.39  0.00  0.00 
      
Targets 10/11: Water & 
sanitation/slum dwellers  Total aid  Water supply & sanitation Basic drinking water 
¯ Access to improved water  -0.13  -0.01  -0.01 
¯ Access to improved sanitation   0.01  0.01  -0.01 
Notes and source: as given in Table 3. 13 
conclusion remains the same, however: donors tend to regard MDG-related indicators of 
need as relevant determinants of aid allocations, but there are again several notable 
exceptions. For example, aid for basic water supply and sanitation is found to be 
unaffected by the number of people with access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
when China and India are excluded.  
In sum, the prevalence of undernourishment and HIV/AIDS are the only MDG-related 
indicators of need that robustly shaped the sector-specific aid per capita given by all 
donors. The evidence on health-related targets is stronger if we only look at the 
weighted estimates, which come closer to analysing whether the allocation of aid is in 
line with the MDGs and on which we focus in the remainder of the paper. Three 
additional health-related indicators—the under-five-mortality rate, the maternal 
mortality ratio, and the incidence of tuberculosis—are found to affect the amount of aid 
allocated to basic health, irrespective of whether China and India are included. For 
education (MDG targets 2 and 3) as well as for water and sanitation (MDG targets 10 
and 11), however, the link between indicators of need and aid categories remains weak: 
only the most imperfect educational indicator, average years of schooling, is significant 
in both specifications of the weighted model. This finding is consistent with Table 1 in 
section 2, where it was shown that donors devoted only about one-third of education-
related aid to basic education and 20 per cent of aid for water and sanitation to basic 
services, whereas two-thirds of health-related aid went to basic health. In other words, 
the persistent bias of donors towards higher levels of service provision may have 
undermined efforts to ensure that all children complete a full course of primary 
education, that gender disparity in education is eradicated, and that poor people have 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation. 
3.3 Donor-specific  aid 
As noted in section 1, earlier studies have shown that the allocation of aid differs 
significantly between donors (e.g., Berthélemy 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006). However, 
previous studies do not consider specific indicators of need related to the MDGs, nor do 
they disaggregate aid. In the following, we compare the allocation of aid across the 
eleven (bilateral and multilateral) donors listed in section 2 by employing the Tobit 
approach with MDG-related indicators of need.22  
Especially when considering the targeting of sector-specific aid, it may be argued that 
differences between donors could be due to donor coordination. Each donor might focus 
on specific MDG targets and specialize in specific aid sectors such as aid for education, 
leaving other targets and sectors to other donors. Hence, insignificant results for a 
particular donor with respect to various other targets and aid categories would not 
necessarily point to this donor having ignored the MDGs, but rather to a division of 
labour with other donors.  
However, donor coordination of this sort is highly unlikely to seriously affect our 
results. This is not to ignore that coordination figures high on the policy agenda of 
donors. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 re-emphasized donor 
commitments made two years earlier at the High-Level Forum on Harmonization in 
                                                 
22 For the reasons stated above, this section presents only the results from the weighted Tobit model. 14 
Rome, including ‘to eliminate duplication of efforts and to rationalize donor activities to 
make them as cost-effective as possible’. But little appears to have been achieved in this 
respect so far. A recent progress report on aid effectiveness notes:  
When measured against the commitments  …,  there is not yet sufficient 
momentum in applying good practice … Many aid agencies still have in place 
arrangements that discourage, often unintentionally, the approaches and 
behaviours necessary to meet the Rome and Marrakech commitments (OECD 
and World Bank 2005: 14).  
Empirical findings support the view that donor coordination remains elusive. 
Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) apply non-nested tests to distinguish between non-
cooperative (Nash-Cournot) and cooperative (Lindahl) behaviour. None of the 15 
donors considered by these authors behaved cooperatively when deciding on the 
allocation of aid. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) employ aid provided by other bilateral 
donors as a control variable when analysing the allocation of aid by individual donor 
countries, in order to test whether donors take note of aid allocations by other donors. If 
coordination and specialization were prevalent, the coefficient of this variable should be 
negative. However, if significant, the coefficient typically turns out to be positive, 
suggesting that donors tend to favour the same ‘aid darlings’.23 We corroborate this 
finding by a simple correlation analysis reported in the Annex. It turns out that 43 out of 
the 55 Spearman rank correlations for total aid per capita are significantly positive. 
Sector-specific aid of individual donors tends to be less strongly correlated with that of 
other donors, but most of the correlations are still positive and very few are significantly 
negative.24 
With donor coordination being unlikely to affect the interpretation of our results, we 
proceed in two steps. For a start, we estimate the weighted Tobit model with total aid 
per capita received from individual donors as the dependent variable. Later, we turn to 
sector-specific aid. MDG target 9 ‘Environmental sustainability’ is no longer considered 
for the reasons given above. Control variables are the same as for all donors combined. 
With some notable exceptions, the allocation of total aid is significantly affected by per 
capita income of the recipient countries (not shown in the table). Denmark, Sweden, the 
UK and IDA consistently grant less aid to more developed recipients. In most instances, 
per capita income enters negatively also for Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Norway, at least when China and India are excluded. Strikingly, however, the 
coefficient of per capita income remains insignificant in almost all estimates for France 
and the US, and in various cases also for the EC.25 
Similar to the results for all donors combined, ‘voice and accountability’ in the recipient 
countries has not shaped the allocation of total aid in the weighted model with China 
                                                 
23  Some small donors not considered in our paper (Belgium, Ireland and Italy) provide exceptions. 
24  In the Annex, we report the correlations for health-related aid, for which there is just one significantly 
negative correlation (between France and the UK). Similar results were achieved for aid related to 
water and sanitation (not shown). With regard to aid for education, five out of 55 correlation 
coefficients turned out to be significantly negative, all involving France. 
25  France and the US are also among the bilateral donors considered by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) 
that take less note of the income poverty of the recipients. 15 
and India included. This applies to all donors under consideration, mainly because India 
got little aid in per capita terms while it was rated favourably with respect to ‘voice and 
accountability’. Once China and India are excluded, Denmark and the UK stand out in 
that they consistently favoured more democratic recipients. Though less consistently so, 
we find similar results for Japan and the Netherlands. In the case of Japan, this is 
probably due to its aid being focused on Asian neighbours which tend to be relatively 
well governed. On the other hand, ‘voice and accountability’ has no effect on the 
allocation of aid by France, Sweden, the US and IDA. With respect to the two big 
bilateral donors, this finding is supported by the recent literature, most robustly so for 
France (Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006) whereas the poor 
evidence for IDA and Sweden contrasts with Dollar and Levin (2006). 
Turning to our variables of principal interest, i.e., MDG-related indicators of need, 
Table 6 shows that, once again, results depend considerably on the inclusion of China 
and India. Some implausible results for the weighted model with all recipients are 
driven exclusively by these two heavyweights. For example, the unexpected coefficients 
of malnutrition of children, the ratio of girls to boys in education and access to 
improved sanitation largely disappear in the estimates without China and India. At the 
same time, some favourable results indicating that specific indicators of need had an 
impact on the allocation of total aid, as suggested by the MDGs, weaken considerably 
when the sample excludes China and India. Most notably, the evidence that greater need 
was associated with higher total aid per capita weakens for MDG targets 3 (primary 
schooling) and 7 (HIV/AIDS).  
It is mainly for the Netherlands, and somewhat less for Germany, Japan and Sweden, 
that the results depend strongly on the sample underlying the weighted Tobit model. 
Results are largely unaffected for Denmark and IDA.26 Based on the complete sample 
of recipients, Table 6 points to striking differences between donors with respect to the 
extent to which specific indicators of need had an impact on the allocation of total aid. 
French aid as well as EC aid was directed to more needy recipients according to ten out 
of the 16 specific indicators under consideration. This does not necessarily imply that 
these two donors outperformed the other donors in terms of targeting aid to needy 
recipients since, as noted before, the per capita income of recipients typically remained 
insignificant in the estimates for France and the EC. However, the fine-tuning of French 
and EC aid according to specific indicators of need qualifies earlier verdicts that the 
poverty orientation of aid by these two donors is particularly weak (see also below on 
sector-specific aid). Denmark represents the opposite case: while none of the specific 
indicators of need shows up significantly with the expected sign, Danish aid was 
strongly related to overall need as reflected by per capita income.  
Yet Table 6, in combination with the findings on per capita income reported above, 
reveals that some donors underperformed in allocating their total aid according to the 
MDGs. This particularly applies to the two largest bilateral donors in terms of total aid 
commitments in 2002-04. US aid was shaped neither by specific indicators of need  
 
                                                 
26 Denmark committed less than 2 per cent of its aid to China and India in 2002-04. At the opposite 
extreme, China and India accounted for 23 per cent of Japan’s overall commitments. IDA committed 
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Target  2:  Hunger                
¯ Undernourishment   -0.05  -0.08  -0.01  0.11 0.16*** 0.12**  0.10** 0.08*  0.05** 0.04** 
¯ Malnutrition of children   -0.18**  -0.11  -0.06*  -0.02 -0.18  -0.15*  -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.05** -0.04 
                
Target  3:  Primary  schooling                
¯ Net primary enrolment   0.11 0.12* -0.03 0.00  -0.10*  -0.09 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02  -0.02 
¯ Primary completion rate   0.03  0.09**  0.00  0.01 -0.15**  -0.12*** -0.06** -0.03  -0.02**  0.00 
¯ Av. years of schooling   0.23  1.73**  0.06  -0.03 -1.57*** -1.10*  -0.68 -0.13  -0.35*  -0.08 
                
Target  4:  Gender  disparity  in  education                
¯ Ratio girls/boys in education   0.21*** 0.17**  0.08** 0.04  -0.09  -0.20*** 0.06 -0.04  0.32* 0.00 
¯ Literacy ratio, males/females   -5.87**  -6.36**  -2.09  -1.39  5.31*** 5.48** -0.55 -0.15 -0.38  -0.10 
                
Target  5:  Under-5  mortality                
¯ Under-5 mortality rate   -0.04** -0.07*** -0.01** -0.01  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.02* 0.01  0.01  0.00 
¯ Immunization, measles   0.19**  0.16*** 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.05 -0.06 0.05  0.02 0.03*  0.01 
                
Target  6:  Maternal  mortality                
¯ Maternal mortality ratio   -0.01**  -0.01*** 0.00 0.00  0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 0.00  0.01**  0.00 
¯ Births attended   0.15*** 0.14*** 0.02  0.02 0.08**  0.08**  0.09*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.02 
                
Target  7:  HIV/AIDS                
¯ Prevalence of HIV   -0.12  -0.43**  0.13  0.10 0.37**  0.24 0.30** 0.15  0.12*** 0.06 
                
Target  8:  Malaria,  other  diseases                
¯ Incidence tuberculosis   0.01  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.00**  0.00 
¯ Malaria ecology   0.16  -0.08  0.02  0.01 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.13  -0.04 0.07**  0.01 
                
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum dwellers                    
¯ Access to improved water   0.00  0.10  -0.01  0.02 -0.12*** -0.11**  -0.07** -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
¯ Access to improved sanitation   0.05*** 0.13** 0.01 0.02  0.04  -0.08  0.08*** 0.02 0.03**  0.00 
              Table  6  continues
Note:  (a   Based on a (weighted) Tobit model estimated with per capita income and governance as control variables; controls and constant term not reported.  




Table 6 (con’t) 
Donor-specific results: total aid (a 

























                    
Target  2:  Hunger                    
¯ Undernourishment   0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07  0.06 0.25* 0.16 0.19** 0.15** 0.19*** 0.18** 
¯ Malnutrition of children   -0.01  -0.01 -0.04* -0.04 -0.05  0.00 -0.31* -0.43*** -0.28** -0.25*** -0.08 -0.04 
                    
Target  3:  Primary  schooling                    
¯ Net primary enrolment   -0.02** -0.02**  -0.01 -0.01  0.01 -0.05 -0.04  -0.04 -0.13* -0.12* -0.09** -0.08* 
¯ Primary completion rate   -0.02*** -0.02**  -0.02* -0.02  -0.04 -0.03  -0.08* -0.02  -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.10*** -0.07** 
¯ Average years of schooling   -0.24** -0.12 0.22  -0.06  -1.05** -0.85  -1.50 1.26  -2.07*** -1.00  -0.60  -0.06 
                    
Target 4: Gender disparity in education                         
¯ Ratio girls/boys in education  0.02  0.00  0.04** 0.03 0.10* 0.02 0.02  -0.03 0.02 -0.19*  0.01 -0.10 
¯ Literacy ratio, males/females  0.04  0.02  -2.38** -2.33** -0.89  -0.07  -0.44  -2.26  2.15 2.67  1.67 1.83 
                    
Target  5:  Under-5  mortality                    
¯ Under-5 mortality rate   0.01** 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.02* 0.02 0.04  -0.01  0.06*** 0.04** 0.04** 0.03* 
¯ Immunization, measles   0.01  0.01 0.03* 0.02 0.05  0.02 0.04  0.04 0.04  -0.02 0.00  -0.02 
                    
Target  6:  Maternal  mortality                    
¯ Maternal mortality ratio   0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00  0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01  0.00 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01* 
¯ Births attended   0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 0.00  0.00 0.12  0.12 0.09* 0.09* 0.01  0.02 
                    
Target  7:  HIV/AIDS                    
¯ Prevalence of HIV   0.12*** 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.13** 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.32 -0.03  0.76*** 0.49*** 0.16 0.01 
                    
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases                         
¯ Incidence tuberculosis   0.00*** 0.00**  0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01**  0.00  -0.01  0.01 0.29  0.01 0.00 
¯ Malaria ecology   0.02  -0.02  0.01  -0.04  0.17** 0.07 0.12  -0.32  0.39*** 0.09 0.15  0.03 
                    
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum 
dwellers 
                  
¯ Access to improved water   -0.01* -0.01  -0.03  -0.02 -0.05  0.00 -0.02  0.06  -0.18*** -0.09 -0.06  -0.04 
¯ Access to improved sanitation   0.01** 0.00  0.02 0.01  0.04 0.01  0.26*** 0.l4 0.14*** -0.02 0.05  0.02 







Donor-specific results: sector-specific aid (a  
Targets/indicators of need   Aid category 
  Target 2: Hunger     
  Development food aid    Emergency food aid 
     
Undernourishment   IDA, (EC)  Germany, US, EC 
Malnutrion of children   Netherlands, Norway, UK, IDA  Netherlands, Norway, UK, US, EC 
      
  Target 3: Primary schooling     
 Education    Basic  education 
Net primary enrolment      
Primary completion rate   France, Germany   
Average yrs of schooling      Norway 
      
  Target 4: Gender disparity in education 
 Education    Basic  education 
Ratio girls/boys in educ.    France, (Germany) 
Literacy ratio, m/f   France France, Germany, (Denmark) 
      
  Target 5: Under-5 mortality     
 Health    Basic  health 
Under-5 mortality rate   France   
Immunization, measles   (France)   IDA 
      
  Target 6: Maternal mortality     
 Health    Basic  health 
Maternal mortality ratio   (Germany), (Norway)    (Norway), (UK) 
Births attended   UK   Netherlands, UK, IDA 
      
  Target 7: HIV/AIDS     
 Health    Population  programmes 
Prevalence of HIV   Norway, (Sweden)    Denmark, France, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, UK, US, EC 
      
  Target 8: Malaria, other diseases     
 Health    Basic  health 
Incidence tuberculosis   Netherlands, Norway, 
(Sweden), (UK), (EC) 
 Netherlands, (UK) 
Malaria ecology   France   (France) 
      
  Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum dwellers 
Access to:  Water supply & sanitation    Basic drinking water 
- improved water      
- improved sanitation   Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UK, 
EC 
  Denmark, EC 
Notes: (a  Based on weighted Tobit model with per capita income and governance as control variables; 
controls and constant term not reported. Donors listed grant significantly more aid to countries 
with greater need as given by specific indicator of need; bold if same result when China and 
India are excluded; in parentheses if only when China and India excluded; italics if per capita 
income significantly negative. 
Source:   Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex. 
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(with only two exceptions, i.e., the prevalence of undernourishment and the primary 
completion rate), nor by per capita income as an encompassing indicator of need. Japan 
stands out in that various specific indicators of need enter with an unexpected sign 
(pointing to more aid for less needy recipients), even though the coefficient of per capita 
income remains insignificant in various estimates for the complete sample of recipients. 
In the second step, we estimate the weighted Tobit model with sector-specific aid as the 
dependent variable. In particular, we assess whether individual donors targeted aid in 
the sense that: (i) food aid was granted predominantly to recipient countries whose 
population suffered from malnutrition and hunger; (ii) the health situation of recipient 
countries has shaped the allocation of health-related aid; (iii) aid for education was 
channelled to where primary education deficits and gender disparities in education were 
most pronounced; and (iv)  aid for improved water supply and sanitation favoured 
recipients with seriously impaired access to water and sanitation. 
As before, we control for per capita income and ‘voice and accountability’. Findings 
with respect to the MDG-related indicators of need are summarized in Table 7. In some 
respects, sector-specific results resemble the results for total aid. In various instances, 
whether or not specific indicators of need have an impact on the allocation of sector-
specific aid depends on the inclusion of China and India. For example, when the two 
heavyweights are excluded, the finding that limited access to improved sanitation went 
along with more aid granted by several donors for water supply and sanitation no longer 
applies. On the other hand, a few donors granted more health-related aid to countries 
with higher maternal mortality ratios, but only in the sample without China and India.  
It is also in line with earlier findings that some donors appear to have taken note of 
specific indicators of need (France, Norway, and the UK), whereas other donors have 
not or have done so only rarely (Japan, Denmark, Sweden, the US and IDA). As for 
total aid, France fine-tuned its sector-specific aid according to MDG-related indicators 
of need, while per capita income typically remained insignificant.27 This is in contrast 
to Norway, whose allocation of sector-specific aid was affected by both specific and 
encompassing indicators of need in various instances. Likewise, when comparing 
donors for whom MDG-related indicators of need appear to have played a minor role, it 
must be taken into account that Denmark, Sweden and IDA granted higher sector-
specific aid with few exceptions to recipients with lower per capita income (not shown 
in the table). This was hardly the case for Japan, and per capita income of recipients 
entered significantly negative in just about half of all regressions run for sector-specific 
aid of the US. 
Table 7 also offers some additional insights on whether donors have specialized in 
helping achieve selected MDGs, and leaving other MDGs to other donors. Donor 
coordination to this effect should have resulted in a pattern where at least smaller donors 
concentrated on specific targets. However, donors such as Norway and the Netherlands 
are listed under as many MDG targets as are such large donors as France, the UK or the 
EC. Moreover, there is little evidence that smaller donors such as Denmark and Sweden 
refrained from entering into areas such as the fight against HIV/AIDS where various 
                                                 
27    In the complete sample of recipient countries, there was actually just one significantly negative 
coefficient for per capita income out of 32 estimates run for sector-specific aid of France (Norway: 21; 
UK: 25). 20 
large donors are engaged. Nor do they appear to have grasped the chance to occupy 
areas which were largely neglected by other donors; the most notable case in point is aid 
for basic education that may help improve primary enrolment and completion. 
It rather emerges that some MDG targets received particular attention by various 
donors, whereas other targets were largely neglected. The evidence for targeted aid is 
strongest with regard to the fight against HIV/AIDS through committing resources to 
‘population programmes’. Target 7 attracted encompassing donor engagement. 
Similarly, indicators of need related to MDG target 2 (‘hunger’) were taken into account 
by all major suppliers of emergency food aid except France. The evidence is 
comparatively weak with respect to so-called developmental food aid. This applies 
especially to the US who committed developmental food aid to an outstandingly large 
number of 77 countries in 2002-04. Arguably, this type of ‘aid’ was still used as an 
outlet of surplus agricultural production at home, with needs-based targeting taking 
second place.  
The allocation of aid for education was hardly shaped by specific indicators of need. 
Most surprisingly, none of the donors under consideration took primary enrolment and 
completion rates into account when deciding on the allocation of aid for basic 
education. Health-related aid appears to be somewhat better targeted than education-
related aid when accounting for (unreported) results on the impact of per capita income 
on aid allocation. In our estimates for aid for health and population programmes, per 
capita income entered significantly negative in about 75 per cent of all cases, while this 
was true in just slightly more than half of all cases for aid for education. However, the 
allocation of health-related aid according to specific indicators of need reveals that 
donors focused on selected targets that figure prominently in public debate (HIV/AIDS 
and, though less so, tuberculosis), whereas less publicized issues such as the 
immunization against measles did not receive particular attention. Essentially the same 
applies to aid for improving access to water and sanitation, once it is taken into account 
that most of the coefficients reported in Table 7 are highly sensitive to sample selection. 
4 Concluding  remarks 
This paper departs from the observation that the Millennium Declaration and the list of 
MDGs consider growth promotion to be just one channel through which aid may help 
fighting poverty. In the same vein, economists such as McGillivray (2003) and Amprou, 
Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2005) have called for a broader concept of 
aid selectivity not just including the income and policy situation of recipient countries 
as proposed by Collier and Dollar (2002). And indeed, donors typically claim that their 
aid allocation is based on a multi-dimensional objective function. 
Yet, various developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, will in all 
likelihood miss not only the most prominent MDG of halving absolute poverty by the 
year 2015 but also the more specific targets, e.g., those related to health and education. 
In this paper, we explore one possible reason for this failure, namely that donors may 
have paid insufficient attention to the MDGs by not allocating aid according to the 
MDG-related needs of recipients. Our results do suggest that at least part of the blame 
falls on insufficient targeting of aid. While some MDGs such as the fight against 
HIV/AIDS have shaped the allocation of aid, the sector-specific results reveal that with 21 
respect to other MDGs, most notably primary education, there is a considerable gap 
between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation. 
Comparing donors, it turns out that the two largest bilateral donors, Japan and the 
United States, have not only failed to meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of gross 
national income to be devoted to aid, but have also performed poorly in terms of 
targeting aid to needy recipients. At the same time, our analysis qualifies previous 
findings on the poverty orientation of donors. France, whose income poverty orientation 
has often been rated as weak, took various specific indicators of need into account when 
allocating aid. By contrast, MDG-related indicators of need have hardly shaped the 
allocation of aid by donors (such as Denmark) that are widely perceived to be superior 
donors because of their strong poverty orientation as measured by per capita income of 
recipient countries.  
These results invite the conclusion that the current focus on substantially increasing aid 
in order to turn the tide and try achieving the MDGs misses an important point. Unless 
the targeting of aid is improved, higher aid will not have the desired effects. At the same 
time, it should be stressed that better targeting is just a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for more effective aid. Reinikka and Svensson (2004), for example, estimate 
that over the period 1991-95, only 13 per cent of a grant received by the Ugandan 
government to cover primary schools’ non-wage expenditures actually reached the 
schools. Likewise, Easterly (2005) reports for four African countries that 30 to 70 per 
cent of drugs distributed by the government disappeared before reaching the patients. 
Given leakages of such magnitude, an obvious avenue for future research would be to 
directly estimate how effective the sectoral allocation of aid is in achieving the various 
MDGs. This would offer more detailed insights than the typically considered aid-growth 
relationship. 
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MDGs  Indicators of need (source) (a  Relevant aid category (b (CRS code) 
  Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger   
Target 1: Halve the proportion of people with  Average per-capita income (World Bank 2005)  Total aid 
income of less than $1 a day (c  Share of population below $1 a day    
  Human development index (UNDP 2005b) 
 
    
Target 2: Halve the proportion of people who  Prevalence of undernourishment (FAO 2004)  Developmental food aid/food security assistance (520) 
suffer from hunger  Malnutrition of children, weight (World Bank 2005)  Emergency food aid (710) 
    
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education        
Target 3: Ensure that children complete a full  Net primary school enrolment ratio (World Bank 2005)  Education (110) 
course of primary schooling  Primary completion rate, total (World Bank 2005)  Basic education (112) 
  Average years of schooling (Barro and Lee 2000)   
    
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women        
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in education  Ratio of girls to boys in prim. & sec. education (World Bank 2005)  Education (110) 
  Literacy ratio, males to females (World Bank 2005)  Basic education (112) 
     
  Goal 4: Reduce child mortality       
Target 5: Reduce under-five mortality rate  Under-five mortality rate (World Bank 2005)  Health (120) 
  Immunization, measles (World Bank 2005)  Basic health (122) 
    
  Goal 5: Improve maternal health        
Target 6: Reduce the maternal mortality ratio  Maternal mortality ratio (UNDP 2005b)  Health (120) 
  Births attended by skilled health staff (World Bank 2005; WHO 2005)  Basic health (122) 
    
  Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases        
Target 7: Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS Prevalence of HIV (World Bank 2005; UNAIDS 2004)  Health (120); pop. programmes & reproductive health (130) 
    
Target 8: Halt and reverse the incidence  Incidence of tuberculosis (WHO 2005)  Health (120) 
of malaria, and other major diseases  Malaria ecology (Kiszewski et al. 2004)  Basic health (122) 
    
  Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability        
Target 9: Integrate principles of sustainable   CO2 emissions per capita (World Bank 2005)  General environmental protection (410) 
development into country policies & reverse   Forest area (World Bank 2005; FAO 2004)  Agricultural land resources (31130) 
the loss of environmental resources  Nationally protected areas (UNDP 2005b)   
  GDP per unit of energy use (World Bank 2005)        
Target 10: Halve the proportion of people w/o sus-  Access to improved water source (World Bank2005)  Water supply & sanitation (140) 
tainable access to safe water & basic sanitation  Access to improved sanitation (World Bank 2005)  Basic drinking water supply &basic sanitation (14030)      
Target 11: Achieve significant improvement in the  Same as under target 10  See target 10 
lives of slum dwellers     
Notes:  (a All indicators for 2000 or closest year. Italics if used only in the analysis of aid by all donors combined; (b In addition: total aid for all MDGs/indicators of need. Italics if used 
only in the analysis of aid by all donors combined; (c Target 1 not specifically considered in this paper; for an analysis of the poverty orientation of overall aid, see the literature given in 










Definition of variables 
1 Aid  variables   
  Grant equivalent per capita  Nominal amount*grant element/100 per population 
of recipient country 
    
2  Indicators of need (a  
  Access to improved water source (-)  % of population 
  Access to improved sanitation (-)  % of population  
  Average years of schooling (-)  Relates to the total population aged 15 and over  
  Births attended by skilled health staff (-)  % of total  
 CO2 emissions per capita (+)  metric tons per capita 
  Forest area (-)  % of total land area  
  GDP per unit of energy use (-)  2000 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent 
  Immunization, measles (-)  % of children of the age of 12-23 months 
  Incidence of tuberculosis (+)  Estimated incidence rate of all forms of tuberculosis, 
per 100,000 people 
  Literacy ratio, males to females (+)  Literacy rate of adult males divided by literacy rate 
of adult females 
  Malaria ecology (+)  Predictive of the extent of malaria transmission 
  Malnutrition of children, weight (+)  % of children under five 
  Maternal mortality ratio (+)  Adjusted ratio per 100,000 live births 
  Nationally protected areas (-)  % of total land area  
  Net primary school enrolment ratio (-)  % of the population of the corresponding official 
school age 
  Prevalence of HIV (+)  % of population aged 15-49 
  Prevalence of undernourishment (+)  % of population 
  Primary completion rate, total (-)  % of the relevant age group 
  Ratio of girls to boys in primary & secondary 
education (-) 
%  
  Under-5 mortality rate (+)  Probability per 1,000 newborn babies 
Note:  (a  In parentheses: expected sign of coefficient if higher need according to indicator went along 




Comparison of aid allocation by major donors:  






































































             
Japan   0.18**  0.00  0.16*  0.03  -0.05 -0.09  0.14* 0.20** 0.22*** 0.29***
Denmark  0.18**  -0.07  0.38*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.40*** 0.21** -0.06  0.29***
France  -0.02 -0.07    0.33*** 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.48*** 0.28***
Germany  0.17** 0.27*** 0.11   0.63*** 0.59*** 0.62*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.26*** 0.50***
Netherlands  0.05 0.42*** -0.04 0.33***  0.75*** 0.75*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.16* 0.43***
Norway  0.05 0.33*** -0.05 0.43*** 0.44***  0.79*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.14* 0.35***
Sweden  0.24*** 0.22*** -0.03  0.29*** 0.22** 0.29***  0.38*** 0.48*** 0.12  0.40***
UK  0.08 0.33*** -0.15*  0.52*** 0.47*** 0.55*** 0.32***  0.30*** 0.28*** 0.40***
US  0.27*** 0.17** -0.04  0.51*** 0.21** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.42***  0.27*** 0.30***
EC  -0.05 0.12  -0.01 0.16*  0.21** 0.07 0.01 0.16*  0.03   0.32***
IDA  0.15* 0.14*  -0.04  0.28*** 0.16* 0.14  0.10  0.35*** 0.22** 0.21**  
Note:    Upper right panel: total aid; lower left panel (italics): health-related aid. ***, **, * significant   
at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
 
 
 